



## **Deliverable D3.3**

### **Report on the Workshop with Vulnerable Citizens**

**Due date of deliverable: 31/10/2020**

**Actual submission date: 30/10/2020**

**William Nicholson\*<sup>1</sup>, Charlotte Hall\*<sup>1</sup>, Dale Weston<sup>1</sup> Richard Amlot<sup>1</sup> and Holly Carter<sup>1</sup>, (\* joint first authors)**

**1: PHE**

## Project details

Project acronym	PROACTIVE
Project full title	<b>PR</b> eparedness against CBRNE threats through <b>cO</b> mmun Approaches between security <b>praCT</b> itioners and the <b>VulnerableIE</b> civil society
Grant Agreement no.	832981
Call ID and Topic	H2020-SU-SEC-2018, Topic SU-FCT01-2018
Project Timeframe	01/05/2019 – 30/04/2022
Duration	36 Months
Coordinator	UIC – Grigore Havarneanu (havarneanu@uic.org)

## Document details

Title	Report on the Workshop with Vulnerable Citizens
Work Package	WP3
Date of the document	30/10/2020
Version of the document	V3
Responsible Partner	PHE
Reviewing Partner	WMP, UIC, DHPOL, UMU, ETICAS, CBRNE, AGS
Status of the document	Final
Dissemination level	Public

## Document history

Revision	Date	Description
01	15/10/2020	First Draft
02	26/10/2020	Reviewed Draft
03	30/10/2020	Final Version

## Consortium – List of partners

Partner no.	Short name	Name	Country
1	UIC	UNION INTERNATIONALE DES CHEMINS DE FER (COORDINATOR)	France
2	CBRNE	CBRNE LTD	UK
3	PPI	POPULATION PROTECTION INSTITUTE (MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC)	Czech Republic
4	DB	DEUTSCHE BAHN AG	Germany
6	UMU	UMEA UNIVERSITET	Sweden
7	DHPOL	DEUTSCHE HOCHSCHULE DER POLIZEI	Germany
8	RINISOFT	RINISOFT LTD	Bulgaria
9	WMP	WEST MIDLANDS POLICE AND CRIME COMMISSIONER	UK
10	ETICAS	ETICAS RESEARCH AND CONSULTING SL	Spain
11	SESU	STATE EMERGENCY SERVICE OF UKRAINE	Ukraine
12	PHE	DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH	UK
13	SPL	STATE POLICE OF LATVIA	Latvia
14	AGS	AN GARDA SÍOCHÁNA – NATIONAL POLICE FORCE IRELAND	Ireland
15	FFI	FORSVARETS FORSKNING SINSTITUTT	Norway
16	NPH	KOMENDA GŁÓWNA POLICJI	Poland

## Executive summary

The following deliverable reports on the workshop held with Civil Society Advisory Board (CSAB) members as part of WP3 - Engagement of the civil society including vulnerable citizens. The workshop aimed to ensure that the needs, views, and requirements of vulnerable groups are enshrined within each exercise. To allow this to take place, the workshop provided an opportunity for the CSAB to have active involvement prior to the joint exercises taking place (WP6).

CSAB active involvement consisted of:

- 1) Taking part in a discussion on the exercise scenario developed within D6.2. CSAB members were asked: 'What do you think of the scenario?', 'Is there anything you think is missing?', 'If this happened what requirements might you, others you represent, or others you know, have in this situation?', and 'If this happened, what information would you like to get as soon as possible?'
- 2) Taking part in a discussion to provide feedback on the recommendations produced within D1.3. CSAB members were asked: 'Which of the recommendations do you think are the most important?', 'Which of the recommendations do you think are the least important?', 'Are there any recommendations that should not be there?', and 'Is there anything you think is missing?' The process followed is very similar to elements of the Practitioner Stakeholder Advisory Board (PSAB) engagement detailed in D2.2.

By carrying out active involvement of the CSAB in both the scenario development and recommendation discussion, we have been able to ensure that the PROACTIVE toolkits and exercises meet the needs of the wide range of groups (including vulnerable groups) within society. The outcomes from this task will therefore provide input into WP5 Toolkit for Civil Society Organisation and WP6 Joint Exercises, Evaluation, and Validation of the Tools.

## Acronym Table

Acronym	Definition
CBRNe	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and explosive
CSAB	Civil Society Advisory Board
D	Deliverable
eNOTICE	European Network Of CBRN Training Centers
EU	European Union
LEA	Law Enforcement Agencies
PSAB	Practitioner Stakeholder Advisory Board
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
WP	Work Package

## Table of contents

<b>1. Introduction.....</b>	<b>7</b>
1.1. Background to the workshop.....	7
1.2. Workshop attendance.....	7
1.3. Workshop accessibility.....	8
1.4. Introduction to CBRNe.....	11
<b>2. Exercise Scenario Discussion.....</b>	<b>11</b>
2.1 Introduction to the exercise scenario.....	12
2.2 Exercise scenario discussion.....	12
2.2.1 Timing of the scenario.....	12
2.2.2 Weather described in the scenario.....	12
2.2.3 Scenario location.....	13
2.2.4 Individuals within the scenario.....	13
2.2.5 Language used within the scenario.....	14
<b>3. D1.3 Recommendation Discussion.....</b>	<b>14</b>
3.1 Information needed during the incident.....	14
3.1.1 Implications for information during an incident.....	15
3.2 Methods of communicating during an incident.....	15
3.2.1 Implications for communication methods during an incident.....	16
3.3 Pre-incident information.....	17
3.3.1. Implications for pre-incident information.....	17
<b>4 Involvement of CSAB members in the next PROACTIVE activities.....</b>	<b>18</b>
4.1 Questionnaire of Civil Society Organisations of CBRNe Preparedness and Response.....	18
4.2 PROACTIVE mobile application for vulnerable citizens.....	18
4.3 PROACTIVE field exercises.....	19
<b>5 Conclusions.....</b>	<b>19</b>
5.1 Next steps.....	19
<b>6 References.....</b>	<b>20</b>
<b>7 Appendix.....</b>	<b>21</b>
7.1 Appendix A: List of Recommendations.....	21

## 1. INTRODUCTION

---

### 1.1. Background to the workshop

Work Package 1 of the PROACTIVE project concerned “human factors analysis of preparedness and response” relating to “CBRNe terrorism in Europe and beyond”. Within this work package, two systematic reviews were conducted, focusing on: 1) academic literature relating to public perceptions of pre-incident preparedness, and during-incident response (e.g., management strategies), for CBRNe events (D1.1; Hall et al., 2019), and; 2) a review of guidance documents which facilitated insight into current policy and practice relating to CBRNe incident management, strategies for communicating with the public and the impact of current policy and practice on vulnerable populations (D1.2; Davidson, Weston, Amlôt & Carter, 2019). These documents were then synthesised together to produce a list of key outcomes and clear recommendations for CBRNe preparedness and response (D1.3; Hall, Weston, Long, O’Sullivan, Amlôt & Carter, 2020). Subsequent stakeholder engagement using these deliverables was planned with both the Practitioner Stakeholder Advisory Board (PSAB) within Work Package 2 (reported in D2.2, Hall, Carter, Amlôt & Weston, 2020), and as part of a major, pre-exercise workshop with the Civil Society Advisory Board (CSAB; detailed within Task 3.2).

In addition, through the activities of Work Package 6, a scenario development process was undertaken involving input from the PSAB; this is detailed within D6.2 (Hall, Nicholson, Carter, Long, Amlôt, & Weston, 2020). Subsequent engagement with the CSAB to ensure “that the needs, views, and requirements of vulnerable groups are enshrined within each exercise” was also planned as part of the workshop detailed in Task 3.2.

As per the Description of Action, this report provides a summary of the major pre-exercise workshop involving representatives of vulnerable groups, with a particular focus on 1) a discussion of the template scenario, and 2) the focus group discussion of the recommendations from Work Package 1.

### 1.2. Workshop attendance

This workshop had been planned for June 2020 in Malmö, Sweden at the kind invitation of the European CBRNE Center at Umeå University (UMU), but in light of the global COVID-19 context, it was postponed and subsequently adapted to be an online meeting.

The workshop was held online via teleconference using an online videoconferencing system and was hosted by UMU. Sixteen<sup>1</sup> CSAB member from 14 organisations took part in the workshop (further details can be found in Table 1). Additionally, 19 project partners attended the workshop

---

<sup>1</sup> In addition, there was one further member of the CSAB who took part in this workshop but who did not identify themselves.

from nine organisations (see Table 2). An external partner, VELOTYPE, who provided live closed captioning subtitles also attended. The workshop agenda can be found in Table 3.

### **1.3. Workshop accessibility**

A number of approaches were used to ensure that the workshop was inclusive and accessible to all. Before the workshop presenters were asked to keep the use of images to a minimum and to send the slides to the organisers ahead of time so that the individual undertaking the closed captioning could see the nature of the presentations. During the workshop, live closed captioning was available throughout and there was a Flemish sign language interpreter for those who had requested this support. Additionally, all the questions written in the chat were read out and answered verbally where possible during the workshop. Lastly, presenters were asked to describe images in their presentation with attendees being asked to comment in the chat if they required more description to understand the image.



**Table 1: Known members of the CSAB who participated in the workshop**

Organisation	Number of Attendees	Country
Doof Vlaanderen	2	Belgium
Flemish Agency for Persons with Disabilities	1	Belgium
Independent	1	Belgium
National Crisis Center	2	Belgium
Laurea University of Applied Sciences	1	Finland
Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft der Seniorenorganisationen	1	Germany
TH Köln	1	Germany
EMERGENZA SORDI APS	1	Italy
Independent	1	Lebanon
Polish Association of the Blind	1	Poland
The Centre for Linguistic Normalization of Spanish Sign Language	1	Spain
SUMMA112	1	Spain
Arena Motion & Rehab	1	Sweden
DHR	1	Sweden
<b>Total</b>	<b>16</b>	

**Table 2: Project partners who participated in the workshop**

Organisation	Number of Attendees	Country
UIC	2	France
CBRNE	3	United Kingdom
DB	1	Germany
UMU	3	Sweden
DHPOL	2	Germany
RINISOFT	1	Bulgaria
National CBRN Centre (WMP)	1	United Kingdom
PHE	4	United Kingdom
FFI	2	Norway
<b>Total</b>	<b>19</b>	

**Table 3: Workshop agenda**

10:00 – 10:10	Welcome and introduction to project PROACTIVE (UIC)
10:10 – 10:35	What is CBRNe? Intro, video and Q&A – the role of the CSAB (UMU)
10:35 – 10:55	Short introduction of attending CSAB members (PHE)
10:55 – 11:20	Exercise scenario discussion (PHE)
15 min coffee/tea/stretch break	
11:35 – 12:35	Discussion on project outcomes: Recommendations for mitigation & management of CBRNe terrorism (PHE)
12:35 – 12:50	<p><b>Involvement of CSAB members in the next PROACTIVE activities:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Questionnaire for Civil Society Organisations on CBRNe preparedness &amp; response (DHPOL, 5 mins)</li> <li>• PROACTIVE App (RINI, 5 mins)</li> <li>• PROACTIVE Field Exercises (CBRNE, 5 mins)</li> </ul>
12:50 – 12:55	Q&A
12:55 – 13:00	Conclusion (UMU)

## 1.4. Introduction to CBRNe

After a short introduction about PROACTIVE provided by the project coordinator (UIC), project partner UMU led on an introductory session to familiarise the CSAB with CBRNe events and incidents. The session began with a summary of the definition and context of CBRNe incidents or events (e.g. events that are rare, potentially very harmful, the substance/agent is often invisible, it requires special actions from Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs), and special actions from the general public). Next, a seven-minute video, commissioned by CBRNE Ltd for PROACTIVE and prepared by Ian Cameron Media & Communications Ltd., was shown to the workshop participants. The video talked about live exercises and the public’s perception of them (e.g. children were shown making posters at school relating to a chemical spill at Portishead). The video stated that in order to help reduce anxiety towards CBRNe events, educating and informing the public is key, which reiterates the aims of the PROACTIVE project. Following the video, UMU provided the CSAB with definitions (e.g. Standard Operation Procedures – SOP) and context (e.g. communication is only effective if it is understood by all). Lastly, there was a Q&A session, giving the CSAB the opportunity to ask any questions.

## 2. EXERCISE SCENARIO DISCUSSION

In the following section, we provide an account of the CSAB discussion relating to the template exercise scenario developed within D6.2. The aim of this discussion was “to ensure that the needs, views, and requirements of vulnerable groups are enshrined within each exercise” and to enable the

exercises to “meet the needs of the wide range of groups within society, in a non-discriminatory way” (as reported in the PROACTIVE Description of Action).

## 2.1 Introduction to the exercise scenario

This section of the workshop was led by PHE and began with an overview of the purpose of the scenario and how it had been developed in collaboration with the PSAB (see D2.2). The scenario was subsequently presented to the CSAB:

*On a cold, wet late evening, you are travelling alone to meet a family member. As you are standing on the platform of an unfamiliar train station, someone wearing dark clothing and a backpack runs through the crowd spraying people with liquid. You look down and realise that your clothing is wet. Your eyes sting and you start to cough. You look around and see that other members of the crowd are also starting to suffer.*

Members of the workshop were then asked a series of discussion points which included: ‘What do you think of the scenario?’, ‘Is there anything you think is missing?’, ‘If this happened what requirements might you, others you represent, or others you know, have in this situation?’, and ‘If this happened, what information would you like to get as soon as possible?’. A summary of the discussion is presented in the subsequent sections.

## 2.2 Exercise scenario discussion

Overall, the discussions from the CSAB indicated that there were various ways in which the realism of the scenario could be improved. Discussion centred on five topics: timing of the scenario, weather, location, individuals within the scenario, and the language used. These will now be discussed in turn.

### 2.2.1 Timing of the scenario

The first area of discussion was the time of the scenario. Members queried why the scenario was set in the late evening. One CSAB member asked whether the purpose of setting at this time was because it was dark. They commented that *“in Sweden and Finland at least it doesn’t have to be late evening [to be dark]”* and suggested changing late evening into describing darkness would add flexibility to the scenario. However, others felt that the time was appropriate and if it was late at night it might lead to a longer response time by emergency responders, or they might not be at the train station already. The consensus was that darkness rather than late evening would be a better setting for the scenario. Related to the time, members of the CSAB questioned whether it was likely that there would be a crowd on the platform late at night, with one member commenting that, *“I’m out late evening... there will not be a crowd”*. Other members reflected that rush hour would be a more reasonable time to have a crowd on a platform, *“yeah, scenario should probably change to rush hour”*. The exact timing of the scenario will be discussed further with eNOTICE and will be contingent upon conditions during the exercise.

### 2.2.2 Weather described in the scenario

The second discussion point centred around the weather. A CSAB member raised the point that *“chemical warfare agents and biological warfare agents need special weather conditions ... water usually neutralize chemical agents and biological warfare agents”*. Discussions centred on setting

the scenario in dry conditions or using radiological agents. It was also mentioned that a spray would be a more effective dispersal method in a closed setting rather than outdoors, but that windy conditions could “*help the perpetrators for dissemination purposes*”. PHE noted that the weather conditions will be dependent on what happens on the day of the exercise, but there is scope to explore this further.

### 2.2.3 Scenario location

The third discussion centred on the location of the scenario (on a railway platform) and whether or not the scenario could include a train carriage. One CSAB member highlighted that placing the scenario on the train could create more challenges with evacuation, especially for individuals with mobility issues. The increased harmful effects of the spray in an enclosed environment rather than outside were also mentioned. Furthermore, CSAB members suggested that this setting might be more interesting as it would have more people moving around the platform, i.e. people leaving the train carriage. CBRNE Ltd raised that the purpose of the exercises is to train first responder’s responses rather than mimic a live attack situation and so it was important that the attacker was not still on scene. Members of the CSAB posited that the train could be stopped at the platform, with the attacker entering a train carriage and then leaving again via the platform, or an attack could happen on a train entering a platform, with the attacker escaping in the chaos of the crowd. It was agreed that this aspect of the scenario would be explored further through ongoing exercise planning with eNOTICE.

### 2.2.4 Individuals within the scenario

The fourth discussion focused on individuals within the scenario and whether or not there was a need to be explicit that the crowd included vulnerable members of society, with one member of the workshop saying “*if we want to get all the attention towards vulnerable groups, if it’s already worthwhile to mention their being there in the scenario*”. However, it was countered that “*Don’t we all have to take for granted that a crowd will include persons with disabilities and altered functions in different form?*” and that mentioning a vulnerability might bias the reaction of first responders. Furthermore, it was suggested that mentioning one distinct group in the scenario might lead others to feel excluded, especially groups who have hidden disabilities. While there is scope to reflect on this further, the general consensus from workshop members was that the scenario should avoid mentioning specific characteristics of the crowd. This will also ensure that the scenario is flexible enough to cope with any changes on the day of the exercise.

Members of the workshop also suggested that the scenario could include other participants, e.g. tourists or refugees as they might not be able to speak the language of the country which would lead to a more natural simulation for first responders. A member of the CSAB also asked if “*We could include a baby with the person, child e.g. my son or daughter makes me feel more scared*”. The PROACTIVE consortium mentioned that discussions were ongoing with local schools about the possibility of involving school children in the exercise in Rieti. It was also mentioned that homeless people can seek shelter at train stations, and these might be vulnerable people to consider in the scenario. One member of the CSAB asked if it would be possible to include someone filming what is happening. The exact nature of the type of individuals from civil society involved in the exercise will continue to be discussed with eNOTICE.

## 2.2.5 Language used within the scenario

The final discussion point was that the language used to describe an individual's response might not be appropriate for everyone, i.e. 'you look down and realise' excludes individuals with limited eyesight. However, it was agreed that most people could feel if their clothing was wet. One CSAB member raised the point that it would be hard to feel if your clothes were wet from the spray if the weather was wet and windy, suggesting that the weather of the scenario needs adapting. It was agreed that the weather description will be reviewed (see also point 2.2.2 above).

## 3. D1.3 RECOMMENDATION DISCUSSION

---

Meeting attendees were provided with the full D1.3, a summary of the Deliverable and overview of the work conducted within Work Package 1 and final list of recommendations the day prior to the Workshop. During the workshop, the CSAB were presented with the recommendations (which can be found in Appendix A) which were grouped by category (communication, information dissemination, increasing knowledge, education, planning, best practice and guidance) on a series of PowerPoint slides. It is necessary to note that the majority of available time was spent discussing recommendations which related directly to the CSAB (e.g. not recommendations relating to guidance, planning or best practice).

Discussions were centred around providing feedback on these relevant recommendations, focusing on the following questions: 'What do you think of the scenario?', 'Is there anything you think is missing?', 'If this happened what requirements might you, others you represent, or others you know, have in this situation?', and 'If this happened, what information would you like to get as soon as possible?'. This process is very similar to elements of the PSAB engagement detailed in D2.2. A summary of the key themes arising from the discussion is presented in the subsequent sections.

### 3.1 Information needed during the incident

A member of the CSAB commented that the recommendation<sup>2</sup> which provided four points of priority (in no specific order) for communication with the public could be reordered in accordance with importance. It was suggested that the list should be in the following order: 1) what the public must do (i.e. instructions); 2) why compliance is important; 3) provide information and updates about ongoing security efforts; 4) provide details about loved one's whereabouts (e.g. be clear about which platform and which train was targeted). It was reiterated that the first communication should be to establish public compliance. Additionally, it was also mentioned that the first on the platform are the first responders and they must inform the public quickly. A credible spokesperson should be used to

---

<sup>2</sup> Communication should: 1) inform the public about loved ones' whereabouts in relation to family, friends and pets; 2) provide information about active police and security efforts to apprehend terrorists; 3) provide information on the importance of complying with instruction (including health specific information to address public health concerns; 4) and be delivered by a credible spokesperson (e.g. local resources, hazard groups and health departments).

speak to the media and public outside of the scene. Another CSAB member added that instructions on emergency decontamination, doffing, and the closest source of water are also very important factors that should be communicated to the public.

In relation to the same recommendation another member of the CSAB established that it may be beneficial to think of this recommendation in terms of layers, or a matrix. For example, on-site communication should have clear instructions and provide information on why compliance is important (e.g. take off clothes, as they might be contaminated). For wider communication (i.e., individuals not directly involved in/ affected by the incident), it should be aimed to direct people away from the scene and close off the area. There should also be layers consisting of: public announcements and social media response; a news and media level; and a political level.

Another CSAB member commented that the public, specifically the elderly, should be made aware that there can be a case of terrorism or a disaster (e.g. a fire) in railway stations and on platforms, and that “*we are living in another world from 20 or 30 years ago*”. Additionally, in general, awareness regarding these incidents must be supported by information (e.g. how to manage such a situation).

### **3.1.1 Implications for information during an incident**

Information provided by the CSAB under the theme of ‘information needed during the incident’ supported the proposed recommendations, for example:

- Official communication should be honest, empathic, assertive and reliable.
- Responders should communicate effectively and demonstrate respect for public needs.
- It is necessary to establish whose duty it is to inform the public of CBRNe events, and who should be responsible in communicating during incident information.
- Information campaigns and education to build CBRNe public knowledge should be implemented.
- Communication should aim to reduce anxiety, by providing information to enhance self-efficacy.

Additional requested information (e.g. closest water source and the doffing process) and the importance of providing the public with reasons why compliance is important fall within the recommendations for ensuring efficacy, reducing anxiety and increasing knowledge. However, these specific considerations will be further considered when discussing scenario development with eNOTICE for part of WP6 Joint Exercises, Evaluation, and Validation of the Tools.

## **3.2 Methods of communicating during an incident**

The CSAB then discussed methods of communication that should be used in the event of a CBRNe incident. There was a suggestion of displaying a sign language interpreter on a digital screen to enhance accessibility to information for those who are hearing impaired. Another CSAB member stressed the importance of communicating information in different ways, particularly, for example, for those who are deaf; information that is made available to help protect the public should be accessible to everyone. Providing information in other languages, pictographic forms (with a



preference for real photos in comparison to icons or diagrams), and using cartoon characters to appeal to children, were all additional methods of enhancing communication suggested by the CSAB.

In terms of logistics, one CSAB member noted that “*there is only so much first responders can have with them*” as these resources would have to be in every vehicle used and therefore inexpensive. With this in mind, clear and easy to use pictorial aids, translators in case of emergency, and training in nonverbal communication could be preferable. One CSAB member stated that at least 5% of responders should know foreign languages, in this respect technology was also mentioned as having potential to aid communication.

One CSAB member stated that press conferences should not exceed five minutes and being honest and trustworthy is important. Additionally, the spokesperson should be an expert in the field and not a politician.

One CSAB member questioned the level of communication skills needed to communicate with the public, as in one of the presented recommendations<sup>3</sup> it reads as it is necessary to have a low level of communication skills. However, it was reiterated that this communication seeks to advise that official communication sources should not exaggerate their knowledge of incidents when communicating with the public, nor should they assume that the public is naive. This specific recommendation has been reworded following this discussion (see subsequent section).

### **3.2.1 Implications for communication methods during an incident**

Information provided by the CSAB under the theme of ‘Methods of communicating during an incident’ supported the proposed recommendations, for example:

- Information should be provided in multiple languages, pictographic form, and sign language.
- Messages should be pitched at an appropriate level (in terms of language and complexity).
- Multiple platforms should be used to communicate with the public, with consistent information being provided across platforms.
- Information should be available in writing (i.e. print form), where possible, using non-complex language.

---

<sup>3</sup> Risk communication cannot assume a scientifically ignorant public, and institutions should not exaggerate the superiority of their knowledge and judgment.



Furthermore, one recommendation<sup>2</sup> was rewritten following feedback from the CSAB workshop:

- Institutions should not exaggerate the superiority of their knowledge and judgement during risk communication and should not assume that the public will not understand important messages when they are communicated clearly and explicitly.

The importance of communicating effectively and using multiple methods to do so will be considered when discussing the scenario development with eNOTICE as part of WP6 Joint Exercises, Evaluation, and Validation of the Tools.

### 3.3 Pre-incident information

One CSAB member stated that people who live near a chemical facility should be educated on shelter in place, evacuation and wind direction as a matter of importance. It was also stated that people who live near nuclear power plants should have potassium iodide pills in their home first aid kits to counter radiation effects if there were to be an incident.

One CSAB member stated the importance of building resilience towards misinformation (i.e. fake news). This was agreed upon by the CSAB, and one member stated they have had first-hand experience trying to educate the public with social media and information sessions on CBRNe incidents; but the public are not retaining information or changing their behaviour as they do not perceive CBRNe incidents to be an apparent risk. Methods to educate the public were then discussed. Suggestions included: creation of a communication matrix (i.e. “1. on-site, 2. off-site incident related, 3. inform the public, 4. inform the media etc”) to allow information to be pre-prepared and have guidelines on all communication levels; have easily accessible information available in community centres for the elderly; and to disseminate information about ongoing campaigns to community stakeholders as a way of reaching the community.

Additionally, there was discussion around pre-incident information and CBRNe education having potential to induce anxiety and catastrophising thoughts, especially for children. However, there was preference from other CSAB members that teaching children in schools on how to react during CBRNe incidents and educating them on important factors (e.g. the CBRNe acronym and logos, the decontamination process through an exercise, and importance of stay in place), will be highly beneficial as they will hopefully also transfer the information to their family.

One CSAB member stated that general data protection regulation issues should be investigated, as during the COVID-19 pandemic some cities/communes were asked for addresses of disabled people in their area, to allow them reach out to provide aid; however, their company were not allowed to pass on these details. If this is wanted, special contracts are required to make this possible.

#### 3.3.1. Implications for pre-incident information

Information provided by the CSAB under the theme of ‘Pre-incident information’ supported the proposed recommendations, for example:

- Where there is increased risk (e.g. where a town or city is located where there is a chemical facility or nuclear reactor), people should receive in advance what to do in the case of a CBRNe incident, which will reduce anxiety and worry.

- The public should be educated on how a CBRNe incident may play out, e.g. procedures may be delayed.
- Information should be available on how to distinguish fake news, i.e. which sources are correct, and which are not.
- The public should be educated on who to turn to for support and further information in the event of an incident.
- It would be beneficial to prepare pro-active social media campaigns and get people to know where to go for good information during events.

The creation of public pre-incident information forms the basis for some of the work within Work Package 5 of the PROACTIVE project; this discussion will also be helpful to inform this work.

## **4 INVOLVEMENT OF CSAB MEMBERS IN THE NEXT PROACTIVE ACTIVITIES**

---

The next section of the workshop focused on introducing forthcoming activities that members of the CSAB could be involved in.

### **4.1 Questionnaire of Civil Society Organisations of CBRNe Preparedness and Response**

DHPol introduced their questionnaire that was sent out in early October 2020. The survey aims to analyse special needs and expectations of vulnerable citizens in a CBRNe incident. The speakers commented that all views are important and that they are seeking the views of wider civil society, not just experts in the field. The presentation highlighted how the questionnaire will be hosted on an online server and so there would be no need to download any files. DHPol also showed workshop members how to select one of the nine different languages for the survey. Lastly, the presentation described the sections and types of questions that would be asked, including questions on communication, disaster management, and what to expect in a CBRNe scenario.

### **4.2 PROACTIVE mobile application for vulnerable citizens**

RINI gave an overview of the mobile app RINI is developing for PROACTIVE which will provide a central hub to citizens for CBRNe related information. The app is designed for civil society, and as such is focused on ease of use for vulnerable citizens. This approach means that there will be no need to register to use the app. A key feature of the app is the incident map that will notify users of a CBRNe incident and allow users to receive live updates from emergency organisations. RINI also discussed education functions for schools and explained how RINI are exploring how to tailor the app for e-learning purposes. RINI will be sending out a link to the app over the next month and there will be a chance for CSAB members to provide feedback.

### 4.3 PROACTIVE field exercises

CBRNE Ltd gave a presentation on the planned field exercises. They explained how the exercises are run in collaboration with eNOTICE and that 10 -15% of participants will be members of vulnerable groups within civil society. CBRNE Ltd also explained one key purpose of the exercise; to evaluate the usefulness and effectiveness of tools developed within the project. They clarified the new timings of the three exercises following the delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Lastly, a brief description of the three exercises was presented to the workshop. The first exercise is re-planned for 28<sup>th</sup> April 2021 in Rieti, Italy. This exercise will involve a CBRNe incident in a railway scenario and will focus on the initial response and will include 35 civilians. The second exercise is planned for September 2021 in Dortmund, Germany and will focus on specialist decontamination response in a railway scenario. The final exercise is planned for May 2022 in Ranst, Belgium.

## 5 CONCLUSIONS

---

This deliverable reports on the Pre-Exercise Workshop held with CSAB members as part of WP3 - Engagement of the civil society including vulnerable citizens. In line with the requirements of D3.3, this deliverable reports primarily on the discussions with vulnerable citizens within the workshop (Task 3.3).

Work within Task 3.3 aimed to ensure that the work undertaken in WP1 and Task 6.2 met the needs and requirements of vulnerable groups. This objective was met through a workshop with CSAB members, providing qualitative reviews of the outcomes from the WP1 reviews and discussions around the exercise scenario.

The first section of the workshop was dedicated to a focus-group style discussion of the exercise scenario. Through this process the needs, views, and requirements of vulnerable groups were captured and so will feed into subsequent exercise scenario development. The discussions in the workshop centred around changes to the location, time and weather of the scenario as well as the type of individuals used in the scenario and the language used within the scenario to describe the readers actions.

The second section of the workshop involved focus-group style consultations with the CSAB members around the outcomes from WP1 based on the full report. This discussion helped to identify gaps and to further develop recommendations for onward use within the PROACTIVE project. Discussions in this section focused on prioritising communications, different communication types, and how best to educate and inform members of civil society about the risks of a CBRNe event.

### 5.1 Next steps

As per Task 3.3, the information gathered from this pre-exercise workshop will feed into the development of the WP5 Toolkit for Civil Society Organisation and WP6 Joint Exercises, Evaluation, and Validation of the Tools and ensure that these outcomes meet the needs of a range of groups within civil society.

## 6 REFERENCES

---

- Davidson, L., Weston, D., Amlôt, R, and Carter, H., (2019). Findings from systematic review of current policy for mitigation and management of CBRNe terrorism. PROACTIVE. Deliverable 1.2.
- Hall, C., Weston, D., Long, F., O'Sullivan, F., Amlôt, R, and Carter, H., (2020). Guidelines and Recommendations for Mitigation and Management of CBRNe Terrorism. PROACTIVE. Deliverable 1.3.
- Hall, C., Carter, H., Amlôt, R. and Weston, D., (2020). Report on the pre-exercise workshop with Practitioners. PROACTIVE. Deliverable 2.2.
- Hall, C., et al., (2019). Findings from Systematic Review of Public Perceptions and Responses. PROACTIVE. Deliverable 1.1.

## 7 APPENDIX

---

### 7.1 Appendix A: List of Recommendations

The public should be educated on who to turn to for support and further information in the event of an incident.

It would be beneficial to prepare pro-active social media campaigns and get people to know where to go for good information during events.

Communication should: 1) inform the public about loved ones' whereabouts in relation to family, friends and pets; 2) provide information about active police and security efforts to apprehend terrorists; 3) provide information on the importance of complying with instruction (including health specific information to address public health concerns; 4) and be delivered by a credible spokesperson (e.g. local resources, hazard groups and health departments).

Information should be available on how to distinguish fake news, i.e. which sources are correct, and which are not.

Staff working in highly public places (i.e. railway stations) should be educated on CBRNe preparedness.

Where there is increased risk (e.g. where a town or city is located where there is a chemical facility or nuclear reactor), people should receive in advance what to do in the case of a CBRNe incident, which will reduce anxiety and worry.

Guidance documents should provide evidence-based advice on communicating with the public which can be followed by authorities in the event of a CBRNe incident.

Information should be provided in multiple languages, pictographic form, and sign language.

The use of FAQs should be incorporated into communication efforts to reduce stress on authorities.

Countries should compare their CBRNe procedures with one another to enable a 'best practice' blanket approach to CBRNe incidents. This could also be done through the creation of sample scenarios for each type of incident.

It should be noted who the recommendation is addressed to in terms of stakeholders.

Messages should be pitched at an appropriate level (in terms of language and complexity).

Guidance documents should seek to be uniform in instruction, particularly when released in the same country.

Three dimensions of disaster communication should be used when creating pre-incident information (strategic, contextual and personal).

Guidance documents and SOPs should inform responders about the needs of vulnerable groups and include plans for dealing with such groups in the case of a CBRNe incident.

Clinicians should have time allocated to be educated about CBRNe events, to allow them to appropriately engage with the material.

Official communication should be honest, empathic, assertive and reliable.

Guidance documents should provide evidence-based advice about likely public behaviour, emphasising that the way in which practitioners manage an incident will affect the way in which members of the public behave.

More consideration should be given to developing policy and procedures to assist those with mobility issues (e.g. relating to service animals and essential mobility aids) during CBRNe incidents.

Information provided by authorities should be pre-planned, where applicable, to ensure prioritisation and consistency, provide uniformity and advocate cohesion.

Communication should aim to reduce anxiety, by providing information to enhance self-efficacy.

Guidance should consider individual countries operation methods, i.e. health care system structure, cultural differences.

Multiple platforms should be used to communicate with the public, with consistent information being provided across platforms.

Responders should communicate effectively (in-line with recommendations in the communication section, above) and demonstrate respect for public needs.

Local radio should be used to disseminate information.

Information campaigns and education to build CBRNe public knowledge should be implemented.

Harmonising guidance documents across countries is important (e.g. by sharing best practice across the EU incorporated with local adaptation, uniformity could be achieved), perhaps agreement at policy making level is required.

Guidance documents should provide evidence-based advice on strategies to increase public compliance in the event of a CBRNe incident.

The use of displays, simulations, and online games should be used to engage the public and educate them in CBRNe matters.

It is necessary to establish whose duty it is to inform the public of CBRNe events, and who should be responsible in communicating during incident information.

Information should be available in writing (i.e. print form), where possible, using non-complex language.

The public should be educated on how a CBRNe incident may play out, e.g. procedures may be delayed.

Risk communication cannot assume a scientifically ignorant public, and institutions should not exaggerate the superiority of their knowledge and judgment.